Arab Peacekeepers for Gaza: Reproducing Repression and Occupation?

In the early days of Israel’s attack on Gaza following Hamas’ October 7th attack, US General David Patreus, reflecting on his own experience in counterinsurgency in Iraq, critiqued the Israeli approach for lacking a clear vision of what a post-war Gaza would look like – the ‘day after’ conflict. Military action, he argued, should not be an end in itself but carried out in service of that ‘day after’ vision. One component of this ‘day after’ that has been floated with seriousness in policy, media, and academic circles is the deployment of an ‘Arab peacekeeping force’ to oversee security in Gaza. If, and it’s a big ‘if’, we were to assume that Israel would accept the deployment of such a force, this is a highly problematic proposal that is likely to reproduce perceptions of occupation and oppression.

Peacekeeping is generally understood as the deployment of a third party armed (military, police) force to oversee the implementation of a short-term ceasefire or a longer-term agreed upon settlement. While peacekeeping’s detractors have pointed to a host of high profile failures such as failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda or Srebrenica, sexual exploitation in Haiti, Indian peacekeepers heavy-handed tactics in DR Congo, or most recently Russia’s abdication of its duties in Nagorno-Karabakh, its advocates note broad patterns of success which are more impressive by the nature of Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) being deployed to the most difficult cases. In theory, PKOs can effectively (1) provide increased and credible information to the sides thereby reducing misperceptions or fear; (2) increase the costs of a side reneging on a ceasefire or settlement and remobilizing; and (3) substitute for low-capacity domestic institutions. Importantly PKOs, like Petreaus’ argument for counterinsurgency, is not an end in itself, but should be done, in achieving these three noted aims, in service of a sustainable peace – essentially creating the conditions for that peace.

From the practical perspective, PKOs are effective when they are deployed by consensual invitation and regarded as neutral – often meaning a UN or multilateral composition; when they have a clear mandate, particularly on the use of force; and when they are composed of a sufficiently large force that is funded and well-equipped, deployed beyond the main urban centers and capable of penetrating the local population, and composed of personnel specialized in mandate-specific tasks (such as not relying on combat soldiers for policing functions). 

Returning then to the idea of an Arab PKO, what would its mandate look like in Gaza? Presumably it would need to achieve three objectives. One, taking over the provision of security from the IDF – security for Israel that is – such that Israeli forces are not occupying or holding Gazan territory and that fears of an attack on Israel from Gaza are sufficiently reduced that Israel does not have incentive for operations/incursions into Gaza. Two, provision of security and control of borders in Gaza such that the Gazan population does live in a state of fear of being subjected to Israeli attacks or incursions. And three, provision of basic policing and security functions in the absence of a centralized authority that can limit the petty crime that has followed in the wake of the IDF clearing but not holding areas, enforce property rights, and protect/ensure transport and delivery of humanitarian aid. Such a PKO would not feasibly have a cost-increasing function as (1) it could not credible deliver a punishment against Israel for any incursion and (2) whatever punishment it would mete out against Gazans or Hamas would pale in comparison to the devastating onslaught unleashed by Israel after October 7th. 

With this in mind, consider the problems of an Arab PKO in Gaza. On the one hand, while Arab peacekeepers may benefit from ‘looking like’ those they are protecting or having cultural/linguistic/religious affinity. On the other hand, there are six major drawbacks that make an Arab PKO problematic. 

1. Arab states are not monolithic.

The idea of an Arab PKO for Gaza still raises the question of who will staff such an operation. The conceptualization of monolithic Arab world that universally supports and is supported by beleaguered Palestinians smacks of at best Huntingtonesque oversimplification and worst Orientalist ‘othering’ that views Arab states as monolith, exotic, and stuck in time. Arab states differ in conceptualizations of nationalism or religion, relations with Israel and the Palestinians, political preferences, and military capacities and functions. Importantly many Arab states who would be considered for participation in such a force engage in systematic repression of opposition and ethnic minorities at home and abroad for which any coercive force that would be deployed, military or police, are an instrument. This is evident in the efforts of both Arab monarchies and military governments, such as Egypt’s, to repress political pluralism and particularly political Islamism, regarded not only as a threat to the status quo domestically but abroad as well. 

2.  An Arab PKO is still occupation.

If the primary complaint of Gazans, and Palestinians more broadly, is, correctly, being subjected to foreign or alien occupation in the interest of security, does a foreign PKO, albeit one that ‘looks like’ the local population resolve this issue? Here the distinction of Arab states as non-monolithic is not a pedantic or semantic one. While publics and activists may vocally support the Palestinian cause, do the non-representative governments? Many of these states actively oppose political pluralism or self-determination evident in repression of not only dissent, but Islamist political movements, and their security forces have been structured for repression or maintaining order, often through heavy-handed military action (akin to Israeli’s actions in the last six months) or support for agents willing to take such actions. For example, Saudi Arabia’s ham-fisted intervention in Yemen has killed upwards of 20,000 in indiscriminate bombing and its military has similarly supported the repression of the Shia majority in Bahrain, which has been carried out by foreign mercenaries (often Sunni Muslims) hired as gendarmes by Bahrain Government; the UAE has supported Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo’s Rapid Support Force in Sudan which is engaged in indiscriminate killing in addition to attempting to overthrow the government, and is itself an outgrowth of the genocidal Janjaweed militia; or Morocco whose ostensibly professional and western-trained military has spent the last 50 years occupying and colonizing Western Sahara, which has entailed the construction of a 2,700km wall that bars the native Sahrawis from 85% of the territory with help from South African and Portuguese mercenaries. If an Arab PKO is charged with maintaining order in Gaza and particularly reducing fear in Israel of another attack, then (1) such forces that may be deployed in a PKO are primarily experienced in repression and (2) are another occupation force closing the political space for self-determination. 

3.  Politicized militaries.

In addition to the repressive mandate of such military forces that may be recruited into an Arab PKO is the question of politicization of militaries. On the one hand, militaries may be split between traditional and praetorian forces, with the latter receiving privileged access to training and equipment such as was the case in Syria. On the other, to keep militaries satisfied, they may receive plum economic concessions, such as in Egypt where the army manages an array of business interests and has access to tariff-free imports. This presents two problems. One, military units are subject to the political preferences of individual elites, many of whom favor repressing political pluralism to maintain the status quo – including abroad where they perceive transnational links or support. Two, many of these military forces are able to leverage certain political or economic concessions, and have a history of doing so. How would such forces then behave upon deployment to Gaza? Ideally they would behave neutrally. Yet given their structures and cultures it may be expected that they would (1) engage in non-neutral enforcement or repression that targets political threats perceived by their home state elites, such as the Muslim Brotherhood or other political Islamist organizations and (2) engage in economic opportunism to ‘capture’ or coopt nascent industries, illicit economies, or transborder networks. It should be noted that the pies that the Egyptian military’s fingers extend into include the ‘travel agencies’ that facilitate exit from Gaza into Egypt (most notably Hala Consulting), whose prices have opportunistically increased from 700 USD to 5,000 USD to enter Egypt since Israel launched its attack on Gaza. 

4.  Whose order?

Setting aside the concerns of military professionalism or politicization, is the question of whose order an Arab PKO would be enforcing. As noted above, peacekeeping is not an end in itself, but is done in service of creating conditions for a sustainable peace. Maintaining some form of order would still require a determination of what ‘order’ is – which could mean either a foreign/alien imposition of order, such as determined by Israel, or in partnership with local powerbrokers, such as a revamped Palestinian Authority (PA) or powerful local families/clans who have filled some of the vacuum in cleared by not held areas. Considering these origins of who would determine ‘order’ coupled with the above-noted problems of Arab militaries as political agents, could they, again, realistically be distinguished from oppressors or another occupying force directed against disruptive self-determination movements? Would such a force then be akin to or even worse than the PA’s Preventive Security Service, itself a Palestinian-staffed body which lost legitimacy and was regarded as an enforcer of Israeli order in Palestinian territory?

5.  Making peacekeepers targets?

There is always a danger of peacekeepers themselves becoming targets for attacks or kidnapping, especially if they are regarded as biased or repressive. Katangese forces (many European mercenaries) targeted UN peacekeepers in Congo after Indian peacekeepers indiscriminately attacked a hospital. Or in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serb forces kidnapped peacekeepers and operated in close proximity to them to shield themselves from US airstrikes. In Gaza, this question may be more complicated by virtue of the fact that peacekeepers may be perceived as another form of repression or occupation, and the primary organization of armed resistance since the 1990s, Hamas, is a client of Iran. Numerous Arab states who may be included in an Arab PKO, presumably excluding Syria or Lebanon, have long-standing strategic rivalries with Iran. They would be putting themselves in a position where they would likely become targets of resistance in a location where Iran already has a client network. 

6. Power asymmetry.

As noted above, PKOs are effective when they can alter perceptions that information and intentions are not being obfuscated and derivations or violations will be credibly punished. There are two important parts of this – perception and relative strength. Firstly, it is generally unlikely that militarily powerful states, which Israel is, invite PKOs to territory they control. Then, even if Israel were to, it is important to note that Israel yields a more powerful and professional military than potential candidates for an Arab PKO – due in large part to factors noted above. It is then necessary to consider what happens when a PKO doesn’t uphold the three provisions of a mandate noted above, or more pertinently when Israel subjectively perceives it has failed to do so. A peacekeeping force would not be able to credibly punish or halt Israeli incursions into Gaza in the event Israel perceived a security threat, meaning it could only enforce rules against Gazans and protect them from one another, not the Israeli state, a party in the conflict it would be intended to keep peace in. In this regard, again, a PKO would be akin to the PA’s police force, which could only enforce rules amongst Palestinians, and not protect their property rights from Israel or Israeli settlers. 

The key takeaway from this is not necessarily that Arab states are bad a peacekeeping – though given their structures that may be the case – but rather that the introduction of an Arab PKO in Gaza does not necessarily solve much, but more than likely reproduces the perceptions of occupation or repression that have triggered violent uprisings or terrorists acts in the past. 

Compare the conditions outlined above then with a successful PKO in Kosovo. Kosovo was an administratively distinct territory that in 1990 was placed under direct Serbian rule and subjected to militarized policing and repression in which the local majority population was denied political and economic rights. Since the end of the Kosovo War in 1999, Kosovo has not seen a return to violent conflict, its government has consolidated, and it has trended positively in various measures of governance. 

There are three important differences. First, KFOR was a NATO-led PKO deployed immediately after NATO intervened on the Kosovars’ side of the Kosovo War and was thus welcomed by Kosovo Albanian public who had cheered NATO airstrikes against Serbian forces and whose leaders later erected monuments to Bill Clinton, Madeleine Albright, and NATO itself. Kosovars thus did not regard KFOR as an occupying force or extension of a repressive foreign apparatus, but an extension of a liberating one, while the later EU force (EULEX) whose deployment as ‘status-neutral’ was negotiated with Serbia, was perceived as corrupted and illegitimate through its association with a former oppressor. Second, was that KFOR was composed for professional and apolitical military and police (with the exception of the small Russian contingent) and wielded a substantial power advantage relative to Serbia, whose forces had been depleted by corruption and a decade of wars in Slovenia, Croatia, BiH, and Kosovo. KFOR was supported by a vastly superior NATO arsenal, including air cover from bases in Italy and Turkey, US armored units, and naval forces in the Mediterranean. Thus KFOR could not only provide domestic order but credibly deter Serbia from reneging on the Kumanovo Agreement and making incursions into Kosovo if it was dissatisfied with the execution of KFOR’s mandate, which it was during the 2000-01 UÇPMB insurgency in southern Serbia in which Albanian insurgents were supplied from Kosovo and used it as a safe haven, and the 2004 ethnic riots in Kosovo that targeted the Serb community. It could not intervene unilaterally without incurring a high and credible cost. Lastly, was that KFOR was deployed in concert with the UN interim administration (UNMIK), which within its first two years had set up provisional representative institutions and a Kosovo Police Service – one of the most trusted institutions in the country. Though far from perfect, this resolved the governance question and the question of whose order was being enforced in concert with peacekeeping. Still, though, despite these successes and intervention in favor of the Kosovars, the most popular party since 2019 has been the sovereigntist Lëvizja Vetëvendosje, which since 2005 has opposed overbearing international influence.